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NOTES
Commercial Lending: Independent Finance Institute v.

Clark: How the Oklahoma Supreme Court Allowed a
Twenty-Seven-Year-Old Footnote to Force Political
Reform of the Supervised Lending Industry
L Introduction
Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Independent Finance Institute v.
Clark,' held that supervised lenders had incorrectly applied an ambiguously worded

state statute for twenty-seven years.' This opinion caused events that have forced
supervised lenders throughout Oklahoma to refund a substantial amount of money
to consumers In Clark, the majority ruled that the loan-refinancing fees charged
by supervised lenders of small loans since 1969 were excessive.! In so holding, the

Oklahoma Supreme Court disregarded a state agency's long-held statutory
interpretation and instead gave deference to a little-known footnote that was inserted
into the ambiguous statute, not by the state legislature, but by West Publishing
Company.! Notably, at the time of the Supreme Court decision, the state legislature

had amended the ambiguously worded statute to clarify the substantive consumer
law issues involved.' The court's decision in Clark did not follow established legal

principles and functioned, instead, to ratify the use of an attorney general's opinion
as a political weapon.! On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The Clark opinion raises two issues that merit attention. First, a nongovernmental
entity, whose duty was merely to publish the statute, inserted the footnote with
which the court agreed in determining legislative intent.' Serious questions arise

regarding the capacity of West Publishing to insert editorial marks that have the
effect of interpreting Oklahoma law. The second issue raised is the utter lack of

I.. 1999 OK 43, 990 P.2d 845.
2. See id. 9B 12-13, 990 P.2d at 851.
3. See Shaun Schafer, Loan-Interest Repayment on Track, TULSA WORLD, July 16, 2000, at A13.
4. See Clark. 115, 990 P.2d at 851.
5. Id. 1 20, 990 P.2d at 853-54 n.44.
6. See id. 1 16,990 P.2d at 852. Compare 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-205 (2001), with 14A OKLA. STAT.
§ 3-205 (1971).
7. See Joe Robertson. Loan-industry Reforms Taking Shape, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 15, 1998, at AI
(detailing the effects of the 1997 reforms); see also Shaun Schafer, Loan Firms Refunding High Fees,
TULSA WoiD, Sept. 26, 2000, at Al (explaining that some supervised lenders have filed extensions
because they were unable to refund the money that the state has demanded).
8. West Publishing Company is recognized as the official compiler of Oklahoma Statutes in title 75,
section 180 of the Oklahoma Statutes, but it is not a governmental agency, and the state exercises no
control over West.
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deference given to the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Credit's (the
Department) long-standing interpretation of sections 3-205 and 3-508A and B of the
Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code (the Code).9 Traditionally, Oklahoma courts give
a great amount of deference to an agency's statutory interpretation, but the Clark
court dismissed the Department's twenty-seven-year interpretation, reasoning that
unambiguous statutes are not open to agency interpretation."
Importantly, this note does not analyze whether the lending practices exercised
inOklahoma before the 1997 reform were optimal for both lenders and consumers.
Rather, this note focuses on the manner in which Oklahoma case law was utilized
to affect nonlegislative political reform. Part II of this note details the factual
background of the Clark case. Part III analyzes the Clarkcase, specifically focusing
on the issue concerning West's official capacity with regard to Oklahoma statutes.
Part IV examines the Oklahoma Supreme Court's refusal to give deference to the
Department's interpretation of the ambiguous statutes. Part V addresses the court's
treatment of the central issue in the case - the intent of the 1969 Oklahoma
legislature. Part VI highlights the ramifications of the precedent set by Clark on
Oklahoma law, and Part VII concludes the note.
II. Factual Background
A. The Creation of the Statutory Ambiguity
In 1969, the Oklahoma State Legislature enacted the Oklahoma Uniform
Consumer Credit Code." The original Code was a product of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), but the
Oklahoma legislature substantially amended the law before enactment. 2 Specifically, the legislature amended the portions of the Code concerning supervised loans.'3
In Oklahoma, supervised loans are consumer loans in which the rate of the
finance charge exceeds 10% per year." Supervised lenders are persons who make
supervised loans. The version of the Code promulgated by the NCCUSL included
section 3-508, which listed the finance charges that lenders could impose when
making a supervised loan." The Oklahoma legislature divided the section into parts
A and B, providing in A that large supervised loans could incorporate finance
9. The Oklahoma Department of Consumer Credit's original purpose was to administer the
Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code. The Department currently regulates small lenders, pawnshops, credit
service organizations, rent-to-own le.sors, precious gem dealers, and health spas. In addition, the
Department also administers Regulation 7. which governs truth in lending. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No.
96-84, 1996 OK AG 84, 1 1; see also 14A OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-501 to -512 (2001); Duties of
Administrator, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 160:1-1-1.2 (2000).
10. See Clark.,e 13,990 P.2d at 851.
It. See id. ,15
990 P.2d at 851.
12. See id.
13. See id. e 15, 990 P.2d at 851-52. Compare 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-508A (1971), and 14A OKLA.
STAT. § 3-508B (1971), with UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3-508 (1968).
14. See 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-501 (2001).
15. See id.
16. See Clark, 1 15, 990 P.2d at 851-52.
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charges in accord with the original section 3-508, but providing in B that small
supervised loans could charge higher fees 7 Indeed, section 3-508B permitted
supervised lenders to collect an acquisition charge and an installment account
handling charge "in lieu of the lower loan finance charges which are available to
large lenders under 3-508A."" In other words, the basis for the fee difference
between sections A and B was the fact that small amounts of credit with short
maturities require greater charges than larger amounts to be economically feasible
for lenders. 9 The higher fees insured that supervised lenders would be able to
make small short-term loans legally and receive a profitable return.
While the Oklahoma legislature divided section 3-508 into two sections, it failed
to alter other sections of the Code that referred to original section 3-508 to reflect
the division." As a result, section 3-205, which concerns the procedures necessary
to refinance supervised loans, referred to a nonexistent section - section 3-508."I
Section 3-205 stated that lenders could impose refinancing charges in accord with
section 3-508; however, the Oklahoma version of the Code had a 3-508A and a 3508B - thereby presenting an ambiguity."
B. The Footnote
The Code, as passed by the legislature and signed by the Governor in 1969,
contained this ambiguity.' However, in the process of publishing the 1969 statutes,
an employee of West Publishing apparently noticed the ambiguity and, being
familiar only with the original section, inserted a footnote into the annotations of
section 3-205 stating that the text referring to section 3-508 "[slhould read (section
3-508A)."'
Whether supervised lenders did not notice the footnote or simply chose to
disregard it, they followed a reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous statute by
charging the fees allowed by the specific section under which the loan was initially

made." Thus, lenders charged fees according to part 3-508A when an "A" loan
was refinanced and charged fees according to part 3-508B when a "B" loan was
refinanced.' If the lenders had followed the footnote's advice, both "A" and "B"
lenders could have only charged finance charges according to section 3-508A upon

17. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84. 1996 OK AG 84,11 3-4. Notably, the exact dollar amount
that serves as the dividing line between large and small supervised loans is periodically adjusted for
inflation. See 14A OKLA. STAT. § 1-106 (2001). At the time of the attorney general's opinion, any loan
over $640 constituted a large supervised loan, while loans of $640 or less were small supervised loans.
See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 160:20-1-17 (2000). The rationale for the division is that small loans need
greater charges to be feasible. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84, 14.
18. Clark, 1 10, 990 P.2d at 850; see also 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-508B (1971) (amended 1997).
19. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84. 4.
20. See Clark, 1 4, 990 P.2d at 848.
21. See id.; see also 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-205 (1971) (amended 1997).
22. See Clark, 1 4, 990 P.2d at 848.
23. See id.
24. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-205 (1971) (amended 1997).
25. See Clark, 1 5, 990 P.2d at 849.
26. See id.
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refinancing." However, the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Credit endorsed
the lenders' interpretation.' The Department maintained this stance until 1996 nearly thirty years. These facts are especially important because Oklahoma law
gives the Department clear power to supervise the administration of the Code."
C. 1996: The Footnote Is Addressed by the Attorney General
On August 1, 1996, the Administrator of the Department, Charles Jones,
requested an opinion from Attorney General Drew Edmondson with regard to the
proper fees that lenders could charge when refinancing a "B" loan." On February
20, 1997, the Attorney General found that the publisher's footnote, instead of the
twenty-seven-year interpretation by the Department, was the proper interpretation
of Oklahoma lending law." As a result, the Administrator of the Department
notified state supervised lenders that the opinion would be enforced beginning
March 3, 1997. The decision ignited a flurry of activity in the supervised loan
industry because many lenders believed that enforcement of the opinion would drive
some supervised lenders out of business.3

D. The Motivations Behind the Attorney General's Opinion
Starting in 1996, Charles Jones began to level significant criticism against the
supervised lending industry.' Notably, it was Charles Jones who had requested the
attorney general's opinion. In light of Mr. Jones's outspoken criticism, many lenders
viewed the attorney general's opinion not as an accurate interpretation of the law,
but as a political weapon - an attempt to drive the industry to reform in the
legislature.3

27. See id. '112, 990 P.2d at 851.

See id. 5, 990 P.2d at 849.
See id. 1 12, 990 P.2d at 851.
See id. '16, 990 P.2d at 849; Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84.
See Clark, 1 6, 990 P.2d at 849; Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84,1 8.
See Clark, 'I 6, 990 P.2d at 849. Note there was not to be retroactivity.
33. See Joe Robertson, Small Loan Opinion May Cost Lenders, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 21, 1997, at
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Al. Because small loans have short maturities and are overwhelmingly refinanced, only original loans
for short periods would earn the charges that the legislature contemplated were necessary to permit legal,
short-term, small-amount consumer credit. Id.
34. See Joe Robertson, Judge Gives Small-Loan Lenders New Lease, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 17, 1997,
at Al.
35. See id. In fact, that is exactly what the attorney general's opinion succeeded in doing. Lenders,
wary of the consequences of the opinion, opted to quickly accept long-requested reform measures in
exchange for a more favorable lending law than that imposed by the opinion. See Joe Robertson, Curbs
Sought on Refinancing Small Loans, TULSA WORLD, May 15, 1997, at AI [hereinafter Robertson, Curbs
Sought]. The result was a hastily drawn and skillfully passed bill, enacted at the end of the 1997
legislative session, that secured higher fees than section 3-508A, but regulated the aggregation of charges
on frequent refinancings. See Joe Robertson, Effort Pays Off. Small-Loan Bill Overcomes Enormous
Task; Long Odds, TULSA WORLD, June I, 1997, at AI [hereinafter Robertson, Effort Pays 001; see also
14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-205 (2001); 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-508B(4) (2001).
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E. The Political Battle Enters the JudicialArena
In response to the attorney general's opinion, and before the industry resorted to
the legislature, the Independent Finance Institute and twenty-seven lenders initiated
a suit, pursuant to the declaratory judgment provision of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act,' to enjoin the Department from forcing lenders to
comply with the attorney general's opinion." The lenders argued that the twentyseven-year interpretation of the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Credit
controlled the issue, and that lenders should be allowed to charge fees pursuant to
section 3-508B upon refinancing a loan." The trial court granted the lenders a
temporary restraining order, prohibiting the Department from enforcing the attorney
general's opinion."
Subsequently, the court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the lending
industry on April 30, 1997.' The district court placed a permanent injunction on
the Department, prohibiting enforcement of the attorney general's opinion, holding
that the Code allowed supervised lenders to impose handling fees and acquisition
charges pursuant to section 3-508B when refinancing a "B" loan.' In response, the
Attorney General publicly warned all lenders who chose to follow the court's ruling
that they could face "criminal charges" if the decision were overturned. 2 After this
notice, lenders could either rely on the court's ruling or charge the lesser fees and
possibly drive themselves out of business. This situation forced the lending industry
to seek redress in the state legislature.
The Administrator of the Department appealed the trial court's decision to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court." In a 1999 opinion, the court, by a 5-4 margin, held
that the 1969 legislature intended the law to be as the footnote stated, and thus
reversed the judgment of the trial court." Because the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 5 the decision stands as Oklahoma law.'
II1. West's Official Status with Regard to Oklahoma Law
Particularly troublesome in Clark is the fact that the supreme court relied, in part,
on a footnote inserted into the Oklahoma statutes by a nongovernmentalentity. This

36. 75 OKLA. STAT. § 306(D) (2001).
37. See Clark, 'I 7, 990 P.2d at 849.
38. See id.
39. See id. 1 7, 990 P.2d at 849-50.
40. See id. 1 8, 990 P.2d at 850.
41. See id.
42. Robertson, supra note 34.
43. See Clark, i 8, 990 P.2d at 850.
44. See id. 1l20, 990 P.2d at 853-54.
45. Indep. Fin. Inst. v. Clark, 1999 OK 43, 990 P.2d 845, cert. denied sub nom. Sec. Fin. Corp. v.
Clark, 529 U.S. 1054 (2000).
46. Importantly, the 1997 amendments to the statute superseded the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
interpretation of supervised lending law. However, the reasoning used by the court to ignore the
Department's interpretation is still good law.
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footnote, inserted by West Publishing, initially appeared in the 1969 Session
Laws." The attorney general's opinion stated that West Publishing Company is the
official compiler of the Oklahoma Statutes; however, that fact alone should not
support the proposition that any footnote added by West becomes Oklahoma law.
Other than the reference noted in the attorney general's opinion, West Publishing
Company is nowhere mentioned as having any authority to create or change
Oklahoma statutory law. As compiler, West's duties are merely to present the
statutes as enacted by the legislature."9 In the annotation to section 3-205, West
not only presented the statutes, but it also attempted to reconcile the ambiguity
created by the amendments to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code as promulgated
by the NCCUSL.' There are two problems with relying on West's annotations: (1)
Oklahoma law can be substantively affected by an unknown and unelected
individual and (2) to guard against such, time and expense must be exerted to
review carefully West's work.
A. The Attorney General's Treatment of the West Footnote
In Clark, West's official status is not dealt with in detail, but the attorney
general's opinion addressed the subject more extensively.' The opinion noted that
the West footnote not only appeared in the 1969 Session Laws, but also in the 1969
and 1970 Supplement to the Oklahoma Statutes." Additionally, the opinion
mentioned that the 1971, 1981, and 1991 recodifications of the Oklahoma Statutes
all contained the footnote." Further, the legislature had directed West to submit
a compiled copy of the Oklahoma Statutes to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for
acceptance.' The attorney general stated that "[tihe Court, upon approval of the
manuscript, is directed to certify the same 'as to accuracy, completeness and
correctness.""' Based upon this rationale, the opinion concluded that "[fn adopting
the 1971 recodification of the Oklahoma Statutes prepared by West Publishing
Company, the Legislature not only adopted West's compilation of the statutes, but
also adopted the annotations to the statutes."'6

47. See Clark, 1 12, 990 P.2d at 850-51.
48. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84,1 II.
49. As official compiler, West's published statutes are the official laws of Oklahoma; however, the
supreme court acknowledges that a publisher's revisions cannot substantively affect the law. See Clark,
' 12, 990 P.2d at 851.
50. See Clark, 1 15, 990 P.2d at 851; Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84, 16 (citing
Bryce A. Baggett & Fred H. Miller, The Oklauma Version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, in
14A OKLA. STAT. ANN. (West 1969) (appearing as part of the introduction to the Oklahoma Consumer
Credit Code).
51. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84,11 11-13.
52. See id. 1 14.
53. See id Oklahoma is required by its state constitution to "revise, digest and promulgate" the
Oklahoma Statutes every ten years. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 43.
54. 75 OKLA. STAT. § 177 (2001).
55. Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84, 12.
56. Id. 13.
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Of the reasons relied upon by the Attorney General in formulating his opinion,
one of the most suspect is the proposition that a footnote is an "annotation," as
recognized by the Oklahoma legislature. The Attorney General cited Webster's
Third New InternationalDictionary'sdefinition of "annotation" to support the claim
that a "footnote" is an "annotation."" This definition is important because the
section that authorizes the 1971 Oklahoma statutory compilation specifically states
that the statutes as "compiled, codified and annotated ... are hereby adopted.""8
However, the Attorney General failed to recognize that the Oklahoma legislature
had provided its own definition of an "annotation."'" The statutory definition of
"annotation" makes no mention of footnotes.' Instead, title 75, section 175,
entitled Annotations and Citations, speaks only of decisions." Citing Webster's
should be secondary to the authoritative definition provided in the same title and
chapter as the 1971 statutory adoption clause. Hence, the Attorney General's reliance
on Webster's is misplaced, and the 1971 statutes as "annotated" should not include
the footnote inserted by West Publishing Company.
B. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's Treatment of the West Footnote
The Oklahoma Supreme Court chose to sidestep the issue of West's footnote by
focusing instead on legislative intent.' However, the court did briefly mention
decisional law that the attorney general's opinion overlooked.' The Attorney
General reasoned that the footnote became law when it was included in the
recodification of the Oklahoma Statutes, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted
that a publisher's revision only becomes part of a statute if the revision does not
substantively change the law." The supreme court cited a Missouri case, Protection Mutual Insurance Company v. Kansas City,' that held that statutory revisors
may not substantively change the meaning of a law or its intent." Therefore, any
revision that changes a statute's meaning is ineffective, and the law is as originally
enacted. 7 The Clark court also cited City of Ouray v. Olin," which held that a
revisor's addition of words was allowed because the substantive meaning of the
statute was not changed.' The supreme court correctly recognized that the validity
of West's footnote depended solely upon whether the footnote reflected the 1969
legislature's intent. Because the court ultimately adopted the footnote's

57. Id. 'I 14.
58. 75 OKLA. STAT. § 184 (2001).
59. See id. § 175.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Indep. Fin. Inst. v. Clark, 1999 OK 43, 14, 990 P.2d 845, 851.
63. See id. 20, 990 P.2d at 854 n.44.
64. See id. '1 20, 990 P.2d at 853-54 (citing Protection Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kansas City, 504 S.W.2d
127, 130 (Mo. 1974)).
65. 504 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1974).
66. See id. at 130.
67. See id.
68. 761 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1988).
69. See id. at 791.
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interpretation, it follows that the majority believed that the footnote did not
substantively change the statute as intended by the legislature."0
IV. The Highest Respect for a State Agency's Interpretation?
In adopting the rational of the West footnote, both the attorney general's opinion
and the Clark court gave no deference to the Oklahoma Department of Consumer
Credit's long-held, contrary interpretation of section 3-205. In fact, the attorney
general's opinion did not even mention the fact that a state agency had allowed
lenders to practice supervised lending in a manner contrary to the West footnote.7'
Unlike the Attorney General, the Clark majority recognized that "construction of an
ambiguous or uncertain statute by an administrative agency charged with its
administration, although not controlling, is entitled to the highest respect from the
courts - especially when construction is definitely settled and uniformly applied
for a number of years."" Despite this recognition, the Clark court rejected the
Department's twenty-seven-year statutory interpretation, finding instead that
Oklahoma supervised lenders had been charging excessive fees during those twentyseven years.73 The Clark court cited Hendrick v. Walters,74 reasoning that
deference should not be given to a state agency's interpretation when the
interpretation is unreasonable and clearly wrong.7"
In Hendrick, the plaintiff argued that then-Governor David Walters had forfeited
his office because he did not take an oath as prescribed by statute.76 The
Hendrick court held that the Governor did not forfeit his office because an
amendment had impliedly repealed the statute that required an oath to be taken.77
The court reasoned that both the attorney general and administrative agencies had
consistently interpreted the statute to be nonbinding when a public official took
office.78 The Hendrick court recognized that the interpretation of an administrative
agency charged with a statute's enforcement should be given deference.' The court
stated that unless an administrative agency's "construction is found clearly wrong,
it should not be cast aside."'
In Clark, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on Hendrick to disregard the
Department's long-standing interpretation of section 3-205.' The Clark court

70. See Indep. Fin. Inst. v. Clark, 1999 OK 43, 20, 990 P.2d 845, 853-54.
7 1. This fact is surprising, considering that the attorney general is required by law to give a written
legal opinion in response to a question posed. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § I8b(A)(5) (2001). One would
assume that the opinion would address the issues relevant to the question posed.
72. Clark, 9113, 990 P.2d at 851.
73. See id.
74. 1993 OK 162, 865 P.2d 1232.
75. See Clark, 1 13, 990 P.2d at 851.
76. See Hendrick, T 1, 865 P.2d at 1234-35.
77. See id. 91 18, 865 P.2d at 1242.
78. See id. i 19-21, 865 P.2d at 1242-43.
79. See id. 1 22, 865 P.2d at 1243.
80. Id.
81. See Indep. Fin. Inst. v. Clark, 1999 OK 43, 1 13, 990 P.2d 845, 851.
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stated, "This case does not belong in the line of cases which hold that long-standing
enforcement by an administrative agency is entitled to great weight."" The Clark
court rejected the Department's interpretation of section 3-205 primarily because the
Department had recently conceded that the attorney general's opinion was the
correct interpretation of section 3-205.3 This rationale, however, is questionable
considering the fact that the Department's interpretation could be dictated by the
political allegiances of its new Administrator. As the saying goes, "where you stand
depends upon where you sit."
The fact that the 1997-1999 Department agreed with the attorney general's
opinion does not imply that the Department's prior twenty-seven years of
interpretation were wrong. Such reasoning is suspect given the fact that the
members of the supervised lending industry had unsuccessfully attempted to oust
Charles Jones, the then-Administrator of the Department who requested the attorney
general's opinion." In addition, Jones had commented that before he became
administrator, the Department had "acted as the industry's cheerleader, not its
regulator.""5 In other words, it was likely not difficult to elicit Jones's concession
that the attorney general had correctly interpreted section 3-205. Although the court
stated that "this reason standing alone might not be sufficient to reach this result,"
and that "other factors" contributed to the court's conclusion, it is clear that the
majority placed excessive emphasis on the Department's "concession.""
V. The Intent of the 1969 Oklahoma Legislature
The Clark court did address the crucial issue of the case - the intent of the 1969
legislature. The court stated that "[tihe determination of legislative intent controls
statutory interpretation."87 Thus, the key issue in Clark was whether the legislature
intended section 3-205 to allow refinancing fees in accordance with only section 3508A. The court determined the legislature's intent by noting several general
principles: (1) legislative intent is ascertained from the entire act; (2) relevant
provisions contribute to interpretation; and (3) doubt may be resolved by reference
to a statute's enacted history.u
The Clark court also placed emphasis on the specific fact that the Oklahoma
legislature had amended sections 3-205 and 3-508B in 1997.8 The amendments
to the relevant sections cleared up any ambiguity created by the reference to the
nonexistent section 3-508 by (1) making section 3-205 refer to section 3-508A only

82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See Joe Robertson, Small-Loan Lenders Show Little Interest in New Fees, TULSA WORLD, Feb.
25, 1997, at Al.
85. Robertson, supra note 34.
86. See Clark, 9 13, 990 P.2d at 851. The "other factors" referenced in the court's reasoning are
likewise questionable. Id. 9 14, 990 P.2d at 851 (citing Smicklas v. Spitz, 1992 OK 145, 18, 846 P.2d
362, 366).
87. Id. 1 14, 990 P.2d at 851 (citing Smicklas, 918, 846 P.2d at 366).
88. See id.
89. See id. 1 16, 990 P.2d at 852.
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and (2) adding language to section 3-508B that created refinancing provisions for
"B" loans." The Clark court stated that "[a] subsequent amendment to an act can
be used to ascertain the meaning of a prior statute." In so stating, the court relied
on Quail Creek Golf v. Oklahoma Tax Commission. 2 In Quail Creek, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court used a 1991 amendment as evidence of legislative intent
regarding a 1982 act. 3 Although settled law supports the proposition that a
subsequent amendment can be considered evidence of prior legislative intent,9 a
subsequent amendment's probative value logically must decrease with the increase
in time between the two acts. In Clark, the 1997 amendment was used to determine
the intent of the 1969 legislature.
Notably, not only had twenty-eight years passed, but the 1997 amendments also
did not support the Attorney General's position. The lending industry was the
catalyst behind the amendments passed in 1997, and the primary reason for the
change was to avoid the Attorney General's flawed interpretation." Unlike the
attorney general's opinion, the amendments do not limit "B" loan refinancing fees
to section 3-508A, but provide that "B" loan refinancers can charge fees higher than
those detailed in section 3-508A. ' The Clark court recognized that while not
dispositive,"these housekeeping amendments support the Department's position.""
This conclusion is patently wrong.
Concededly, the amendments do substantially limit the charges of lenders who
refinance loans and do reduce the allowable fees when initially granting loans.
However, they do not support the proposition that the 1969 legislature intended "B"
lenders to be limited to the fees allowed in section 3-508A upon refinancing.99 On
the contrary, the amendments support the position of the Oklahoma lenders. Unlike
the attorney general's opinion, the amendments allow acquisition fees and
installment-handling account charges when a "B" loan is refinanced." Despite this
contradiction, the Clark court concluded that the amendments support the position
of the Attorney General because the amendments require supervised lenders to
rebate acquisition fees and installment-handling charges that the lenders had not
earned at the time of refinancing. t "' For example, when a "B" loan is initially
issued to a debtor, the lender imposes acquisition fees and installment-handling
charges."' If the loan is later refinanced, the amendment allows lenders to assess

90. See id. Notably, the amendments did not render the Clark decision moot because the decision

did affect the interpretation of section 3-508B between the time the Attorney General released his opinion
and the effective date of the amendments.
91. Id.
92. 1996 OK 35,. 10, 913 P.2d 302, 304.
93. See id. TI 7-11, 913 P.2d at 303-04.
94. Clark, 116, 990 P.2d at 852 (citing Quail Creek, 1 10, 913 P.2d at 304).
95. See Robertson, Curbs Sought, supra note 35; Robertson, Effort Pays Off, supra note 35.
96. See 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-508B (2001).
97. Clark, ' 16, 990 P.2d at 852.
98. See 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-508B (2001).
99. See id.
100. See Clark, 16, 990 P.2d at 852.
101. See 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-508B (2001).
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additional acquisition fees and installment-handling charges at 3-508B rates, but it
also requires the lender to refund the portion of the original acquisition fees and
installment-handling charges that were not yet earned."'2 This provision is fair
because when a loan is refinanced before its term, some of the debt that was to be
paid in the future would have acquisition fees and installment-handling charges
attached to it.'10 Thus, a lender would have no right to fees imposed on money
that it will collect by refinancing.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the legislature could not have
intended that lenders be allowed to charge acquisition fees and installment-handling
account charges on money that the lender had refinanced." 4 The court's reasoning
relies on an argument advanced by the attorney general's opinion."l The opinion
states that the Oklahoma Code is closely related to the Texas Code, citing The
Oklahoma Version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code." The Attorney General
stated that both Texas and Oklahoma differentiate between small "B" loans and
large "A" loans. The Attorney General reasoned that both states had divided section
3-508 because both legislatures had realized that extending small amounts of credit
was not commercially feasible considering the modest finance charges that could be
imposed coupled with the high risk of default.' T As a result, the legislatures
allowed "B" lenders to charge an acquisition fee and an installment-handling charge
in lieu of the lower finance charges allowed in section 3-508."l
However, the Attorney General found that the two Codes differ in the manner in
which refinancings take place. The Texas Code allowed a lender, upon refinancing
a "B" loan, to levy the fees provided for in section 3-508B, but required the lender
to rebate the fees that were not earned at the time of the refinancing."' In
contrast, the Oklahoma version did not clearly require lenders to rebate the unearned
fees upon refinancing because the section requiring that, 3-205, referred only to
section 3-508. Thus, the Attorney General concluded that, in contrast to Texas, the
Oklahoma legislature had intended to limit the allowable fees to those provided for
in section 3-508A.110
Essentially, the Attorney General, and later the supreme court, viewed the
Oklahoma version of the Code as a trade-off. The Clark court reasoned that the
legislature could not have allowed Oklahoma lenders to charge the higher "B" loan
fees without requiring them to rebate unearned fees upon refinancing."' However,
the lack of clarity as to rebates in the 1969 Code was not a deliberate trade-off;
section 3-205 should have referred to both sections 3-508A and 3-508B. It is

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
IlI.

See id.
See id.
See Clark, 1i 18-19, 990 P.2d at 853.
See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84, 1 16.
See Baggett & Miller, supra note 50.
See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 96-84, 1996 OK AG 84, 18.
See id.
See id. Ti 17-18.
See id. T 18-19.
Indep. Fin. Inst. v. Clark, 1993 OK 43, 1 18, 990 P.2d 845, 853.
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important to note that section 3-205, as adopted by the 1969 legislature, was
unchanged from the version promulgated by the NCCUSL. The legislature simply
failed to address the issue of "B" loan refinancing charges because the legislature
was unaware of the issue. The 1997 amendment did require rebates of unearned
fees upon refinancing a "B" loan, but neither that fact nor the rationale of the
supreme court and attorney general support the proposition that the legislature
originally intended the Oklahoma Code to be a trade-off. While Oklahoma lenders
may have been allowed to earn more money than Texas lenders, standing alone, this
does not indicate that the legislature intended the Code to be a trade-off.
To bolster its rationale, the supreme court pointed out the fact that the Code's
general purpose was to protect consumers, and that this general purpose was
evidence of the legislature's intent to limit Oklahoma lenders to section 3-508A
finance charges upon refinancing a "B" loan.' However, the supreme court failed
to recognize that allowing feasible, legal credit protects consumers from resorting
to illegal loansharking and that the Code also balances the interests of Oklahoma
lenders in the formulation of its rules. If there had been no prior agency
interpretation, and the statute was entirely void of any indication of legislative
intent, then the ambiguity might have been correctly resolved in Clark. However,
Clark overlooks the fact that the department charged with administration of the
Code had already interpreted the statute.
The most potent indicator of the legislature's intent is its inaction. For twentyseven years, the legislature did not contest the Department's practice of allowing
lenders to assess acquisition fees and installment-handling account charges when
refinancing "B" loans. While the Clark court chose not to defer to the Department's
long-standing interpretation, it should have at least considered that the legislature
did not act to revise the ambiguity until the Attorney General issued his opinion
against Oklahoma lenders. This is evidence that the legislature acted in 1997
because it believed that the attorney general's opinion incorrectly interpreted the
3
law.'
VI. Ramifications of the Clark Decision
Ultimately, the determination of legislative intent was the primary issue in Clark.
The majority had to choose between two sources to find the legislature's intent: (1)
the West footnote or (2) the almost three decades of consistent interpretation by the
Department. The Clark court recognized that the footnote would be invalid if it
substantively affected Oklahoma law, but passed over this complication by declaring
that the footnote correctly expressed the intent of the 1969 legislature."4 In fact,
the court stated that "[o]bviously, the Legislature originally intended, as the
publisher of the 1969 Session Laws indicated by a footnote to the statute, that the

112. See id.
113. See Robertson, Effort Pays Off, supra note 35. Robertson's article is an excellent account of
the factors that came together to pass the 1997 reform measures.
114. See Clark, M 13-15, 990 P.2d at 851-52.
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reference to § 3-508 '[s]hould read Section 3-508A."' "' This declaration is
unsupportable. In reality, the 1969 legislature failed to recognize a problem; no
evidence of an intent by the legislature for a trade-off exists. The only real evidence
is the construction given by the agency that was created to oversee the implementation of the Code.
The consequences of the Clark decision have taken a toll on the small lending
industry." '6 It is possible that because of the legislature's mistake the supervised
lending industry had been legally taking advantage of consumers; ' 7 however, the
proper avenue to correct such a problem is the legislature itself. Charles Jones, the
Administrator of the Department, found an alternate way to force reform on the
industry, and the Attorney General was willing to cooperate. The trial court was
wise enough to apply the law correctly, but the slim majority of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court simply stamped their approval on the tactics of the Attorney General
and Charles Jones."' Notably, Charles Jones was fired from his position as a
result of the turmoil that was experienced by the supervised lending industry."9
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Clark opinion is the fact that the
supreme court's decision only affected the lending industry during the six months
between the trial court's decision and the effective date of the 1997 legislative
amendments.' After the amendments were passed, the entire industry knew to
either conform its practices to the new law or face the consequences. However, in
the interim, when the trial court had interpreted the law favorably to the industry,
some lenders ignored the attorney general's threats of criminal prosecution, relied
upon the trial court's judgment, and continued to charge the higher fees. Thus, the
opinion only affected those lenders who relied on the trial court's ruling during this
interim period.'
As a result of the supreme court's opinion, the Department initiated a "Refund
Plan" that required lenders to repay the higher fees, amounting to millions of dollars,
that they had charged during the six-month interim.' The lenders had no choice
in that six-month period. They could have charged lesser fees, in accord with the
attorney general's opinion, and potentially forfeited millions. On the other hand, they

115. Id. 20, 990 P.2d at 853.
116. See Robertson, supra note 7.
117. Indeed, evidence suggests that some members of the supervised lending industry were
encouraging frequent refinancings, resulting in an interest rate of 200% or more. See Robertson, supra
note 34.
118. This is not to say that the Attorney General conspired with Charles Jones or even had any
intentions of forcing reform in the supervised lending industry. However, the attorney general's opinion
cannot withstand legal analysis.
119. See Robertson, supra note 34.
120. See Clark, 21, 990 P.2d at 854.
121. The Clark court recognized that making the decision apply retroactively to all lenders that had
used the higher refinancing fees since 1969 would be inappropriate. Id. Therefore, the cut-off date for
retroactive application of the supreme court's opinion was the date that the attorney general's opinion was
to begin being enforced. Id.
122. See Shaun Schafer, Consumers to Get Refunds .for Loan Company Overcharges, TULSA
WORLD, Aug. 10, 2000, at Al.
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were entitled to rely on the judgment of the trial court. It is questionable whether the
upon
state can legally force a refund, considering that the lenders justifiably relied
23
court.
state
a
and
agency
administrative
Oklahoma
an
by
an interpretation
VII. Conclusion
Even though the final outcome of this ordeal may be fruitful for the state and
consumers, the ends do not justify the means. Charles Jones may have been
justified in his criticism of the Department's policy during the nearly three decades
before he became the administrator. However, the law simply should not have
allowed reform to take place in the manner in which it did. In the future, it is
imperative to enlist the assistance of the legislature, not the judiciary, when a
glaring ambiguity is discovered in Oklahoma statutes.
Unfortunately, the precedent set by the Clark court will now be cited in every
brief combating an agency's interpretation of a law. Furthermore, this precedent will
empower judges to engage in judicial activism, as the Clark majority did deciding what they think the legislative intent should be, arbitrarily admitting or
denying evidence of administrative interpretation. Ultimately, such legal analysis
amounts to nothing more than judges deciding what the law should be, not what it
actually is. By the same token, in the future a publisher's footnotes can likewise be
either recognized or stricken. This decision, as the Clark court states, "does not
belong in the line of cases which hold that long-standing enforcement by an
administrative agency is entitled to great weight," for the line of cases that the Clark
majority mentions were, unlike the case at bar, more soundly based on the law."

Frank Sullivan, III

123. This is an entirely separate issue that deserves its own article. The author is not aware of any
lawsuit disputing the state's authority to force the refund, but lenders should consider the possibility that
their reliance on the trial court's judgment estops the state from demanding refunds.
124. Clark, 1 13, 990 P.2d at 851.
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